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Abstract
This article denes in a precise manner three dierent mechanisms to
achieve impartiality in distributive justice and studies them experimentally.
We consider a rst-person procedure, the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, and two
third-party procedures, the impartial spectator and the ideal observer. As
a result, we nd striking dierences in the chosen outcome distributions by
the three methods. Ideal observers that do not have a stake in the allocation
problem nor information about their position in society propose signicantly
more egalitarian distributions than veiled stakeholders or impartial spectators.
Risk preferences seem to explain why participants that have a stake in the
nal allocation propose less egalitarian distributions. Impartial spectators
that are informed about their position in society tend to favor stakeholders
holding the same position.
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Jena Economic Research Papers 2010 - 040Impartiality is one of the principle virtues of public institutions. That judges,
civil servants or politicians may act partially in their private lives (for example,
by favoring their children over the children of others) is perfectly legitimate. In
contrast, that they act in a biased, partial manner in their respective positions to
either benet themselves or family and friends, or to even harm others is wholly
illegitimate. Such conduct undermines the very foundations of the institutions for
which they work. Indeed, partiality in the public sphere can lead to corruption,
which completely outlaws a political system (Warren 2004).
It should come as no surprise, then, that heated debates are launched in the
public arena when impartiality as a democratic value is threatened. In the USA,
for instance, an intense debate has been initiated on the impartiality of judges that
embark on complex judicial campaigns (Huber and Gordon 2004; Gibson 2008).
Judicial impartiality may be seriously weakened when judges must engage in an
electoral battle to become re-elected given the inevitable features of such campaigns:
the defense of personal interests, attack ads, campaign contributions, and politicians'
support of dierent candidates. The institutional legitimacy of the justice system
may come under threat when citizens question the impartiality of judges as a result
of these campaigns.
An interesting debate has also been launched recently in France on the im-
partiality of companies hiring new personnel. In 2006, a law was passed in France
that obligated companies with more than 50 employees to accept anonymous cur-
ricula vitae to prevent discrimination in lling vacancies. The measure attempted
to impede companies from excluding candidates for ethnic, gender or social reasons.
Although the law was initially ignored, in 2009 a few hundred French rms decided
to implement the anonymous CV scheme in an experimental manner.1
However, in spite of the key importance of impartiality in social and political
Oxford, UK. E-mail: luis.miller@nueld.ox.ac.uk, Phone: +44-1865-614 991.
1Relance du CV anonyme, outil de lutte contre la discrimination  a l'embauche, Le Monde,
3.11.2009.
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conduct. The aim of the present study is to dene in a precise manner and experi-
mentally study dierent mechanisms to achieve impartiality in matters of distribu-
tive justice. We begin with a discussion of previous research, where we distinguish
four types of procedures to obtain impartial results, and review related experimental
literature. We then present our experimental design and predictions. Finally, the
experimental results are presented and discussed.
Types of impartial procedures
Impartiality is a negative concept which, from a formal viewpoint, is constrained to
prescribing that we should not be partial, that is, that our actions should not take
into account who they benet or who they harm (Gert 1995). In other words, what
the formal concept of impartiality tells us is that we must give equal treatment to
all in order to treat all as equals (Dahl 1989; Barry 1995), but it says nothing about
how to do so.
When choosing general principles of distributive justice, there are a few mech-
anisms to ensure that the conditions of impartiality are in place. The question is
to determine, rst, who is to take the decision, and, second, what information this
person must have to make the decision. The decision maker can be the stakeholder
herself (rst-person impartiality devices) or an uninvolved third person (third-person
impartiality devices). Both types of decision makers can have either all or only part
of the information that is relevant to the situation at hand. The impartial mech-
anisms that result from this distinction can be summarized in the following ideal
types:
Part of information Full information
First-person perspective Veil of ignorance Ideal speech situation
Third-person perspective Impartial spectator Ideal observer
Table 1: Impartiality-inducing mechanisms
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uential theories of distribu-
tive justice and a vast amount of experimental papers, particularly on the veil of
ignorance as we will see in the following section. First, we will highlight the central
elements through which these dierent procedures attempt to ensure that impartial-
ity is not merely formal, but substantive. After that we will give a short overview
on the related (experimental) literature.
The metaphor veil of ignorance originally proposed by John Rawls ultimately
reminds us that our personal interests and prejudices favor partial reasoning. For
Rawls, then, if a rational and self-interested stakeholder is placed in an `original'
position in which she does not know her place in society because she is covered by a
veil of ignorance, impartiality is assured. In such a hypothetical situation everyone
is treated with equal concern and can choose the principles of justice freely (Rawls
1971; 2001).2
The third-party impartiality procedures share with the theory of the veil of
ignorance the idea that impartiality can only be achieved by excluding the personal
interests of the stakeholders from the decision. To achieve this aim, the decider must
be left out of the decision-making process, which is undertaken from the perspective
of a third-person who has nothing to gain from the outcome of the decision.
In the more radical case of these third-party procedures{that of the ideal ob-
server{it is not that the observer is well informed but she is assumed to be all
knowing, omniscient. In addition to having a powerful imagination, the observer
must be disinterested, dispassionate and logically consistent (Firth 1952; Mongin
2001). Thus we can claim that any political principle governing society will be
impartial, objective and universal when it is established by an ideal observer.3
2In his in
uential discourse ethic, Juergen Habermas (1990) sets the principles that should
regulate a good society based on what he calls the `ideal speech situation' that is, an impartial
context free of any kind of constraint. However, ideal speech situations are not covered in this
paper.
3At rst glance the ideal observer theory could seem completely out of focus. However, the ideal
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stipulating an omniscient observer, it excludes parts of information that could be
crucial to making impartial decisions. Specically, the fact that the ideal observer
is dispassionate (much like a machine) rules out information that could help in
making impartial decisions. The ideal observer-like the veiled stakeholder{does not
put herself in someone else's shoes when reasoning impartially. Neither the ideal
observer nor the veiled stakeholder reveals sympathetic preferences (Binmore 1994;
Sudgen 2002), as they are `mutually disinterested rather than sympathetic' (Rawls
1971, 187). The situation in which both the ideal observer and the parties in the
Rawlsian original position nd themselves forces them to see their arrangements in
a general way, and not out of interest for others.
The impartial spectator, on the other hand, is neither disinterested nor dispas-
sionate, but an emotional being that attempts to obtain the best possible informa-
tion about a case upon which she must take an impartial decision: `[The spectator]
must adopt the whole case of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and
strive to render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation upon
which his sympathy is founded' (Smith 1976, 7). Thus, while it is true that for
Smith the spectator `will be impartial just because he is not a party to the conduct
judge' (Raphael 2007, 19), the spectator must also be capable of sympathizing with
the other person from both a cognitive and an emotional standpoint if she is to
exercise impartiality (Griswold 1999; Konow 2009). For this reason, the spectator is
not merely a disinterested and dispassionate observer, she is not a super judge, but
an attentive spectator, who by imagining that she is in the others' shoes fully iden-
ties with their situation. This emotional and cognitive identication permits the
observer has had a large in
uence on some anti-positivist theories of law (Dworkin 1977; Hare,
1981). The idea, for example, of an infallible judge with superhuman powers - Dworkin's judge
Hercules - is based precisely on the theory of the ideal observer. Real judges would be impartial if
they held the perspective of a judge Hercules as a prescriptive ideal to which to aspire, although
they know full well that such an ideal cannot be attained.
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of the actor and which, in turn, permit consensus to be reached on the principles
governing society.
The distinction between the veil mechanism and the spectator mechanism is
evident. Hidden behind a veil of ignorance, the decider is a stakeholder who possesses
no information about herself, has full information about the laws governing society
and human psychology, lacks sympathy and is therefore dispassionate, and makes
decisions ex-ante in an uncertain situation (Rawls 1971). The impartial spectator
is not a stakeholder, although she is immersed in a situation that she must judge
impartially. She is neither an ideal observer, nor omniscient and disinterested, but
is well-informed about herself and the case she must judge; a judgement that can
only be made ex-post, that is, once the spectator is in possession of all the relevant
facts. Moreover, the impartial spectator is an emotional being that sympathizes
both cognitively and emotionally with the other person, meaning that the general
rules of society cannot be deduced from a hypothetical situation, but emerge from
`our continuous observations upon the conduct of others' (Smith 1976, 86). In light
of these dierences, which of the three mechanisms can best ensure impartiality?
Related experimental literature
In contrast to the aims of this article, the majority of experimental papers have
centered on the results of real decisions behind an experimental veil of ignorance
rather than on the question of impartiality itself. Assuming that this mechanism
produces impartiality, much of the experimental work has consisted in investigating
if real deciders behind a veil of ignorance would choose the Rawlsian dierence
principle or another principle of justice rather than concentrating on the nature of
impartiality (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992; Scott et al. 2001; Michelbach et al.
2003; Becker and Miller 2009). Depending on how the experiments are designed,
the conclusions are of the most varied kind: from those that support Rawls to those
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consensus that behind the veil experimental subjects choose a `package' of principles
in which, depending on the circumstances, merit, equality, eciency and needs are
assigned greater weight.
Methodological questions have raised concerns on the possibility of taking
Rawls' mental experiment to the laboratory. Indeed, the experimental subjects
know their real identity, and impartial reasoning can therefore be aected by the
personal characteristics of the subjects when making a decision in an experimental
setting (Frohlich and Oppenheimer 1992). Does the same thing occur with an ideal
observer and with an impartial spectator? In other words, is impartiality threatened
when the decision is made in a laboratory by a spectator or a detached observer?
And how can these other impartial mechanisms be taken to the laboratory setting?
There are few works that pose this question and even fewer which compare the
results of dierent procedures from the viewpoint of impartiality.
Amiel et al. (2009), for instance, use a questionnaire experiment in which
they compare the distributive decision of two dierent observers: detached and
involved observers. Involved observers are asked to imagine that they themselves
are going to suer the consequences of two dierent economic policies that will be
implemented in an imaginary world. They show that the experimental subjects
are more willing to accept policies to redistribute income from the poor to the rich
when they occupy the position of detached observer rather than involved evaluator.
The authors of the study claim that since the involved evaluator is in
uenced by
the outcome of the redistributive policy, she will inevitably act from a partial, self-
interested perspective.
In a similar vein, Traub et al. (2005) compare the decisions of a self-concerned
subject to those of an umpire in a risky scenario and in an ignorance scenario (where
`scenario' means `future income position' ). The umpire is an outside observer (a
judge, a policy maker), that is, someone without stakes in the game after the veil
has been lifted. In the self-concern mode "the evaluator is asked to imagine that
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the veil of ignorance has been lifted" (p. 284). What is of interest to us here is the
fact that the authors compare the behavior of self-concerned subjects and umpires
in risky and uncertain situations and reach the conclusion that the umpires show
much less aversion to inequality than the self-concerned subjects. Moreover, this
moderate aversion bears no relation to the information that they are given about
probabilities on the dierent income distributions.
These and other similar works provide important information about the deci-
sions made by experimental subjects in situations other than the veil of ignorance
setting. However, the general aim is to analyze the nal results of a variety of impar-
tial mechanisms, without questioning the actual impartiality of such mechanisms.
In this sense, the work by James Konow (Konow 2003; 2008; Croson and Konow
2009) is an exception. Unlike other experimentalists, Konow explicitly assumes that
more information is better than less. Impartiality is not a matter of ignoring one's
identity and circumstances but instead a matter of gathering morally relevant infor-
mation, that is, information that causes a statistically signicant shift in the mean
judgment of spectators. In Konow's words, "relevant information [not only] reduces
stakeholder bias to insignicance" (Konow 2008, 19), but promotes consensus.
Konow distinguishes between three theories of impartiality: Rawls' veil of ig-
norance, Habermas' discourse ethic, and Smith's impartial spectator. These theories
share a common ground, namely, all of them accept that impartiality entails the ab-
sence of bias and promotes consensus. Konow claims, however, that Smith's theory
is the most promising one in generating impartial results, at least from an empirical
point of view. However, not much empirical work has been done on the Smithian
impartial spectator.
In order to bring the impartial spectator to the lab, Konow proposes what he
calls a `quasi-spectator model' due to the diculties of implementing the Smithian
spectator per se. The quasi-spectator is a real world, third-party observer that
should not be a salient stakeholder and is well, but not completely, informed. The
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experimental and vignette studies, Konow shows that relevant information leads
to consensus among the spectators, promotes consensus among the stakeholders
and, most importantly, that stakeholders with relevant information could become
sympathetic spectators (Konow 2008; Croson and Konow 2009). In other words,
relevant information produces impartial results among both spectators and stake-
holders, thus questioning the idea that impartiality is better achieved in a context
in which personal identity is ignored.
We build on this existing literature by experimentally comparing dierent
types of impartiality. We depart from previous studies by comparing behavior under
three dierent impartiality conditions: a veiled stakeholder, an impartial spectator
and an ideal observer. The experimental design is described in section 4.
Experimental design and procedures
We study a three-person distribution problem where a pie is allocated among three
members of a group, whom we call veiled stakeholders. In addition, every group has
an associated spectator.
Stakeholders and spectators dier in their perspective on the situation, which
is our rst treatment variable. Although both veiled stakeholders and spectators
make a decision upon the distribution of the pie, stakeholders are aected by the
distribution and thus decide from a rst-person perspective, while the spectators
remain unaected and therefore take an outside or third-person perspective. Our
second treatment variable is the amount of information that each decision maker
has on the situation at hand. For purposes of clarity, in what follows we describe
the situation in more detail.
Veiled stakeholders dier with respect to an initial endowment. Following a
specic procedure at the beginning of the experiment, the stakeholders are assigned
either a low, a medium or a high relative endowment position. The procedure
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cannot infer their own position from it. The relative endowment position implies
that each stakeholder receives an actual endowment in each round of the experiment,
which is denoted by elow for the lowest, emedium for the medium, and ehigh for the
highest endowment according to the ranking that was previously determined by the
position.4
Spectators also dier with respect to an initial endowment. Half of the specta-
tors receive a xed endowment, which is the same in each and every round. We call
these spectators ideal observers. The other half is assigned an endowment position
and receives an actual endowment in each round according to the same procedure
that the stakeholders engage in. These are called impartial spectators. This treat-
ment distinction is established to grasp the theoretical dierence between these two
impartial procedures. The ideal observer is ideal because she has all the information
she needs to judge a real situation which she is not involved in at all. In contrast,
the Smithian impartial spectator is a real person embedded in society that judges
social situations impartially by putting herself in other people's shoes. To re-create
the Smithian impartial spectator in the lab we place the spectator in the same ini-
tial (arbitrary) situation as that of the stakeholder. This allows us to study whether
sympathy emerges and whether it aects impartiality.
Now, whereas stakeholders learn neither their relative endowment position at
the beginning of the experiment nor their actual endowment in each round, spec-
tators are informed about it. However, the instructions state that the stakeholders
receive one of the three endowment positions. How much endowment actually goes
to each position, and thus the set of actual endowments, is made public in each
round. Even though this is common knowledge, stakeholders lack one important
item of information for making their decision on the distribution of the pie, namely
4The arbitrary initial distribution is designed to resemble real world unequal distributions.
Stakeholders' ignorance regarding their positions is demanded by the Rawlsian impartiality condi-
tions we are simulating.
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Given that spectators and observers decide from an outside perspective, they
occupy a position such that they do not economically benet from the decision they
take. As long as ideal observers are completely detached they are not emotionally
aected by the social situation of the subjects either{they do not feel sympathy. We
suppose, however, impartial spectators may develop a feeling of sympathy towards
stakeholders' situation for they share the same initial endowment and they can
better understand the stakeholders' situation.5
Although the sets of actual endowments diered from round to round, the
average endowment was kept constant at 40 Experimental Currency Units (here-
after ECU), which was also equal to the xed endowment of ideal observers. The
endowment sets varied in terms of the inequality between the three endowment po-
sitions, which is measured by the standard deviation of the endowment sets. The
experiment comprised 12 subsequent rounds. The endowment sets varied in each
round the inequalities corresponding to them range from a standard deviation of 0,
where each endowment position received 40 ECU, to a standard deviation of 52.91,
where low received 0 ECU, medium received 20 ECU and high received 100 ECU.
The task for each subject in every round consisted of allocating an additional pie
of 180 ECU among the three stakeholders, i.e. relative endowment positions. One
of the four decisions in each group was randomly selected and implemented. Veiled
stakeholders received the share of the pie that was allocated to their position in
addition to their actual endowment. Spectators and Observers received a xed pay-
ment of 60 ECU for their decision plus their endowment. The experimental design
is summarized in Table 2.
In the second part of the experiment we assessed subjects' individual value ori-
5Being dispassionate, ideal observers disregard this kind of information. They are fully informed
because they have all the information they need. On the contrary, impartial spectators do not
disregard emotional information{sympathetic information. However, as real observers they are
not fully informed by denition.
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1st-person Stakeholder elow, emedium or ehigh dep. on position and
part (behind a VOI) decision implemented
3rd-person Impartial spectator xed (40 ECU) xed (60 ECU)
full Ideal observer elow, emedium or ehigh xed (60 ECU)
Table 2: Experimental design
Note: In each treatment the group consists of three stakeholders and one spectator. Each group
member decides on how to allocate the pie of 180 ECU among the stakeholders. The sum of the
endowments equals 120 ECU. Whereas the stakeholders do not know their endowment, the
spectators learn it before distributing the pie.
entation by using the `Ring-test' (Liebrand 1984). During this part subjects made
16 choices between two self-other combinations and were based on that classied
into aggressive, competitive, selsh, cooperative and altruistic types. A more de-
tailed description of the test is provided in Oermann et al. (1996).
At the end of the experiment and after providing feedback about the payment, we
asked the subjects to ll out a post-experimental questionnaire, including demo-
graphic questions, their region of origin and social background. We also elicited
their (normative) beliefs and their risk attitude in a non-incentivized way.6
The computerized experiment was conducted at a large university in Germany
using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). The participants in the experiment
were undergraduate students from dierent disciplines who were recruited using
ORSEE (Greiner 2004). None of the participants was informed of the purpose of
the experiment and the subjects were allowed to participate only once. After being
seated at separate computer terminals, the subjects received written instructions,
which were also read aloud by the experimenter to ensure that the they shared the
6For risk elicitation we asked: How willing are you to take risks in general? (Dohmen et al.
2010). Subjects had to indicate their risk attitude on a scale ranging from `not at all risk taking'
(0) to `very risk taking' (10).
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The experiment began with a control questionnaire, which the subjects had to
complete to ensure that they understood the instructions. Questions were answered
privately. We ran 8 sessions in total. In three sessions per treatment we applied the
decision method, while in two sessions we applied the strategy method; one for the
ideal observer treatment and the other for the impartial spectator treatment. Each
session lasted on average 1.5 hours and involved 24 participants, of which 18 were
stakeholders and 6 were spectators. The subjects earned experimental currency units
(ECU) during the sessions, which were later transformed into euros at an exchange
rate of 100 ECU=10 €. The average earnings per subject were 15 €and ranged
from a minimum of 3.95 €to a maximum of 23.75 €, including the show-up fee of
2.50 €.
Predictions
From a normative point of view, all three mechanisms we implement have the same
objective: to achieve impartiality. From this perspective, the decisions of stake-
holders, ideal observers and impartial spectators should therefore not dier. Taking
into account that the initial distribution of endowments was completely arbitrary,
the decision of the three impartial deciders should lead to the same result from a
distributive justice point of view, namely the initial inequalities should be redressed
and the nal endowments equalized as there is no reason to give more to one subject
than to another. From a behavioral point of view, however, we identify three factors
that could make a dierence in decisions.
A rst factor is that of economic incentives. Whereas stakeholders have an
incentive to nd an allocation that satises their economic interest, spectators do not
have an incentive to do so. Nevertheless, other incentives that could also motivate
spectators to implement a meaningful decision are possible, such as the reduction
of cognitive dissonance by choosing a just allocation (Konow 2000).
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uences behavior is risk attitude, even though
this is true only in the case of the veiled stakeholders. A risk-averse stakeholder
would distribute the additional pie such that nal outcomes are equal and thus
compensate for initial dierences. A risk-loving stakeholder, on the other hand,
would gamble and distribute most of the money to the high endowment position. In
the experiment we have included independent measures of risk attitudes as well as
pro-social behavior in order to empirically disentangle risk aversion and pro-social
motives.
A third factor that could aect behavior is connected to Adam Smith's argu-
ment that the spectator is not merely a disinterested and dispassionate ideal ob-
server, but an attentive spectator that fully identies with the other's situation by
imagination. Sympathy for the stakeholder's luck could lead to a dierent decision
than that of veiled stakeholders and ideal observers.
Results
The data were drawn from 8 experimental sessions involving a total of 192 sub-
jects. Each session lasted for 12 periods. In six sessions we used the direct response
method, while in two sessions we used the strategy method (Selten 1967).7 Given
that each subject makes 12 decisions, we obtained a total of 2880 allocation deci-
sions, of which 1872 are from veiled stakeholders (hereafter VS), 504 from impartial
spectators (hereafter IS) and 504 from ideal observers (hereafter IO).
7Under the direct response condition, every participant was always either a stakeholder, an
impartial spectator or an ideal observer. Under the strategy method condition, every participant
decided as a stakeholder and as either an ideal observer or an impartial spectator. We use the
latter method to increase the number of observations for spectators and observers. As will become
clear, the elicitation method does not aect participants' decisions.
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Our empirical strategy relies on the comparison of participants' allocation decisions
under the three impartiality conditions. To achieve this end, we rst calculate the
standard deviation of participant's allocation as a measure of the inequality of the
allocation.8
Figure 1 shows the mean ex-post inequality under the three conditions. The
mean ex-post standard deviation of VS and IS are 45% and 68% larger than the
mean ex-post standard deviation of IO, respectively. We nd similar results when we
concentrate on the number of participants that propose an ex-post egalitarian dis-
tribution (standard deviation=0). The percentages of ex-post egalitarian decisions
are 54%, 57% and 68% under IS, VS and IO conditions, respectively. Therefore, IO
clearly behave in a more egalitarian way than VS and IS.
Are aggregate dierences between the three methods a result of dierent be-
havioral patterns at the individual level? We model the decision to propose an
ex-post egalitarian distribution and the decision to deviate from that distribution
separately. This is done following the logic of a `hurdle model' (Cameron and Trivedi
1998), where the two processes generating the ex-post egalitarian allocation (i.e. a
standard deviation of 0), and the deviations from the ex-post egalitarian distribution
(i.e. a positive standard deviation) are not constrained to be the same.9 Whereas
a random eect probit model is used to model the decision to propose the ex-post
egalitarian allocation, a random eect tobit model is used to study the distribution
of decisions above the hurdle (a positive standard deviation).
Controlling for the initial inequality, the period and the elicitation method,
8A standard deviation equal to 0 implies an ex-post egalitarian outcome where the three stake-
holders receive the same nal amount. The higher the standard deviation, the less egalitarian the
allocation.
9More specically, the hurdle model "uses a two-stage modeling process. The rst stage models
the binary variable that measures whether the response falls below or above the hurdle. The second
stage uses a truncated model to explain the observations above the hurdle" (Min and Agresti 2005).
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Number of subjects 192 192
Note: Results are obtained by random eect regressions using the standard deviation of
participants' allocations as the dependent variable. Stakeholder takes the value 1 if the decision
comes from a Veiled Stakeholder, 0 otherwise. Spectator takes the value 1 if the decision comes
from an Impartial Spectator, 0 otherwise. Initial Inequality is the standard deviation of initial
endowments and ranges from 0 (initial endowments are equal) to 52.91. Period takes values 1 to
12 according to the period of the experiment. Method takes the value 1 if the strategy method
was used, 0 otherwise. *** denotes signicance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level.
Table 3: Hurdle Model Estimates of Inequality in Outcomes (standard errors in
parentheses)
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both stakeholders and spectators are more likely than observers to deviate from the
ex-post egalitarian distribution (see the probit model in Table 3). Once deviated
from that distribution, VS and IS propose more unequal allocations than IO (see
the tobit model in Table 3). Furthermore, we nd that over time subjects are less
likely to deviate from the ex-post egalitarian distribution, and also allocate more
equally once they deviate.
Result 1. Ideal observers are more likely to propose an ex-post egalitarian
distribution. They also propose more equal distributions overall.
Result 2. Subjects learn to allocate more equally over time.
Why do VS and IS behave in a less egalitarian manner than IO? In section
5.2. we explore a rst answer to this question. We study whether risk attitudes and
social orientation aect allocations under the three conditions.
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We now explore some behavioral determinants of participants' decisions. Speci-
cally, we concentrate on the impact of risk attitudes and social value orientation on
allocation decisions under the three conditions.
Given that IS and IO have no stake in the allocation, risk attitudes should
not matter for them. In contrast, VS' risk attitudes may bias their decision. A
risk-averse stakeholder would propose an ex-post egalitarian distribution to protect
herself against a bad outcome (Rawls 1971). On the contrary, a risk-loving stake-
holder would allocate all the pie to the highest endowed position, hoping to be in
that position once the veil is lifted.
The impact of social value orientation is not so clear a priori. Using the
so-called ring test (Liebrandt et al. 1985), we categorized subjects into altruistic,
cooperative, selsh, competitive and aggressive types (see Appendix for details).
Most of our subjects (80%) were selsh types. Other than that, only the category of
cooperative types was large enough to include in the analysis (19%). VS may have
other-regarding preferences over the nal distribution of outcomes and, therefore,
intuitively cooperative types would propose more equal distributions. IS and IO have
no stake in the distribution, therefore a distinction between selsh and cooperative
types should not matter much for explaining behavior. On the other hand, Konow
(2009) shows that this outside view, together with being suciently informed about
the situation, is precisely what enables deciders to achieve consensus in choosing
what they consider just or fair.
Table 4 shows that risk aects VS', but not IS' or IO's decisions. For stake-
holders, the more risk averse a subject is, the more egalitarian the nal outcome.
Figure 2 plots this relation in more detail. Furthermore, the right graph (VS de-
cisions) shows a number of observations in the top-right corner corresponding to
high values of the risk variable and high levels of inequalities. This is qualitative
evidence of the argument that risk-loving VS allocate a higher proportion of the pie
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Stakeholders Stakeholders Spectator Spectator Observer Observer
Risk 0.169*** 3.998*** 0.141 3.171 0.114 2.363
(0 .061) (1.286) (0.134) (2.557) (0.174) (3.154)
Cooperative -0.317 6.701 -0.745 -20.579 0.004 1.351
(0.376) (8.042) (0.867) (16.669) (1.088) (20.345)
Low Type -0.044 -0.561
(0.049) (0.698)
High Type 0.025 0.751
(0.060) (0.857)
Ini. Inequality 0.013*** 0.366*** -0.061 -1.075 0.025*** 0.749***
(0.003) (0.057) (0.128) ( 1.818) (0.008) (0.117)
Period -0.027** -0.273 -0.096*** -1.297*** -0.106*** -1.649***
(0.011) (0.192) (0.027) (0.383) (0.028) (0.391)
Method 0.463 8.939 0.443 8.902 0.241 3.062
(0.326) (6.964) (0.674) (12.817) (0.826) (15.450)
Constant -1.463*** -37.189*** -0.219 -33.561 -1.925 -45.609**
(0.389) (8.194) (1.229) (20.464) (1.216) (22.432)
Observations 1872 1872 504 504 504 504
Number of subjects 156 156 42 42 42 42
Note: Results are obtained by random eect regressions using the standard deviation of
participants' allocations as the dependent variable. Risk takes values 0-10, where 0 denotes 'not
at all risk taking' and 10 'very risk taking'. Cooperative takes the value 1 when the subject has
been classied as a cooperative type in the ring test, 0 otherwise. Low Type takes the vale 1
when IS receive the lowest endowment, 0 otherwise. High Type takes the value 1 when IS receive
the higher endowment, 0 otherwise. Initial inequality is the standard deviation of initial
endowments and ranges from 0 (initial endowments are equal) to 52.91. Period takes values 1 to
12 according to the period of the experiment. Method takes the value 1 if the strategy method
was used, 0 otherwise. *** denotes signicance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level.
Table 4: Hurdle Model Estimates of Behavioral Determinants (standard errors in
parentheses)
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Figure 2: In
uence of subjects' risk attitude on ex-post equality
Result 3. Risk attitudes aect veiled stakeholders' decisions. Risk-averse
subjects promote ex-post equality. Risk-loving subjects propose more unequal dis-
tributions.
We nd no relation between cooperativeness and allocation decisions. This
speaks in favor of the hypothesis that the social preferences of participants do not
aect individuals' decisions under impartiality conditions.
The Impact of Information
Thus far we have shown that risk attitudes may explain why VS deviate more often
than IO from the ex-post egalitarian distribution. However, we still need to explain
why IS and IO behave dierently. In this section, we explore the only dierence
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Information about endowments may aect IS' decisions in two ways. First,
the mere fact of receiving a low, medium or high endowment may lead spectators to
behave dierently. For instance, low-endowed spectators may support more equal
distributions. Second, IS may favor spectators of their own type. We explore these
two ideas consecutively.
Spectators' regressions in Table 5 control for spectators' positions (low, medium,
high). We clearly show that IS do not condition on their position when they make
an allocation. This is in line with what Becker and Miller (2009) nd regarding
stakeholders that have learned their position. Let us now focus on the question of
whether IS favor stakeholders of their own position.
Figure 3 plots the average amount that IO and IS allocate to each of the
stakeholder positions.10 We compare the IO decisions (white bars) to the amounts
allocated by the three spectator positions (black bars). Stakeholders receive consid-
erably more from spectators of their own position. Thus, a low-endowed stakeholder
receives on average 20ECU more from a low-endowed spectator than from an IO;
a medium-endowed stakeholder receives on average 18ECU more from a medium-
endowed spectator than from an IO and a high-endowed stakeholder receives on
average 7ECU more from a high-endowed spectator than from an IO.
At an aggregate level, when IS deviate from an ex-post egalitarian distribution
they seem to favor stakeholders of their own kind. To test whether this result is
signicant at the individual level, we compare the behavior of IS and IO using a
random eect linear regression on the nal amount dierent stakeholders' positions
receive (Table 7). We nd that spectators signicantly favor stakeholders of their
own type. The eect is strongest for the low-endowed spectators. This last result is
very reasonable given that distributive preferences and favoritism point to the same
direction only among low-endowed spectators.
10We only consider decisions that deviate from the ex-post egalitarian distribution.
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Spectator -6.381 -0.896 -12.650
(9.541) (5.978) (7.784)
Initial Inequality -0.832*** -0.417*** 1.248***
(.099) (0.096) (0.097)
Period 0.571* -0.318 -0.232
(0.324) (0.310) (0.316)
Method 4.745 -8.440 3.270
(8.520) (5.636) (7.119)
Constant 97.935*** 111.797*** 91.271***
(8.680) ( 6.279) (7.484)
Observations 395 395 395
Number of subjects 56 56 56
Note: Results are obtained by random eect regressions using the standard deviation of
participants' allocations as the dependent variable. Stakeholder takes the value 1 if the decision
comes from a Veiled Stakeholder, 0 otherwise. Spectator takes the value 1 if the decision comes
from an Impartial Spectator, 0 otherwise. Initial inequality is the standard deviation of initial
endowments and ranges from 0 (initial endowments are equal) to 52.91. Period takes values 1 to
12 according to the period of the experiment. Method takes the value 1 if the strategy method
was used, 0 otherwise. *** denotes signicance at the 1% level and ** at the 5% level * at the
10% level.
Table 5: Random eect linear regression estimates of nal amounts given to stake-
holders (standard errors in parentheses)
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Result 4. Spectators distribute signicantly more to stakeholders of their
own position than ideal observers. The eect is strongest for low-endowed spectators.
Summary of the Results
We nd striking dierences in the outcome distributions of three dierent impar-
tiality inducing methods. Ideal observers that do not have a stake in the allocation
problem nor information about their position in society propose signicantly more
egalitarian distributions than veiled stakeholders or impartial spectators.
To some extent, risk preferences seem to explain why participants that have
a stake in the nal allocation propose less egalitarian distributions than observers
without a stake. On the contrary, cooperative preferences do not predict the behav-
ior of any of the methods studied .
When we compare the behavior of two dierent types of detached third-parties,
information about their position in society clearly matters. Unlike the ideal ob-
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to favor stakeholders holding the same position. This result is strongest for low-
endowed spectators.
Discussion
As democracy itself, impartiality is both a matter of procedures and results. Biased
results discredit procedures, and poorly-designed procedures (e.g. those that ex-
clude people unjustly or do not treat them as equals) discredit results. This article
has experimentally shown that when rules of distributive justice are to be deter-
mined impartially, two procedural features are critical: the perspective (e.g. rst-
or third-person) and the amount of information decision-makers have at their dis-
posal. Unlike conceptual work alone, a combination of conceptual and experimental
work provides us deeper insight into these matters.
From a purely conceptual standpoint, the dierences between the three im-
partial methods studied are clear. Procedures inspired by Rawls' veil of ignorance
attempt to exploit the benets of including the perspective of the stakeholders but,
at the same time, exclude their narrow self-interest from the impartial decision pro-
cess. The rst-person perspective therefore ensures that those who have a stake will
not delegate their decision to a non-involved third party.11 Of course, the price to
be paid is the absence of information that might be crucial to guarantee that the
results will be fair once the veil is lifted. On the other hand, risk has a prominent
in
uence on veiled procedures for a group of risk-averse stakeholders would take a
very dierent decision from that of a group of risk-loving stakeholders.
Ideal observer and impartial spectator procedures have the advantage of using
a larger amount of relevant information, but the disadvantage{at least in matters of
distributive justice{of excluding stakeholders from a decision that will aect them
11First-person impartial procedures attempt to respect the liberal ideal that personal interests
are better served by oneself.
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Pure conceptual analysis allows us to make predictions about the behavior of
impartial decision makers. However, conceptual work alone would be incomplete.
Experimental work is therefore a promising way of testing impartiality theories and
their consequences in a lab environment before applying them to real life experiences
(Konow 2003, 1191).
In the particular context of our experiment, in which an unjust and undeserved
initial distribution is redressed, dierent impartial procedures may suer from dif-
ferent biases. Both economic interests and risk attitudes may bias stakeholders'
decisions. Similarly, identication with stakeholders may bias spectators' decisions.
In principle, there are no reasons to suspect any bias aecting ideal observers. In-
sofar as they are `ideal' they have no stake in the decision and do not belong to
the `society' of stakeholders. A priori, this factor short-circuits potential biased
behavior.
If distributive justice demands that a set of resources arbitrarily distributed
at the beginning of the experiment be equalized, veiled stakeholders and impartial
spectators turn out to be less likely to comply with such demands by proposing an
ex-post egalitarian allocation.
Stakeholders' behavior is more predictable than that of spectators in this re-
gard. In line with previous experimental work, stakeholders' behavior behind the
veil is in
uenced by risk attitudes in our experiment as well. Risk lovers leave every-
thing to chance and act as gamblers that show no interest in fair results, but only
in maximizing personal gains. In contrast, risk-averse stakeholders act as Rawlsian
players that try to ensure a fair portion of the pie for themselves once the veil is
lifted. In both cases the impartial procedure is heavily determined by stakeholders'
psychological attitude towards risk. Thus, the results of any impartial mechanism
based on uninformed stakeholders' decisions may depend on the psychological traits
of the focus group members, which may bias the outcomes of this kind of procedures.
Neither risk nor economic interests aect ideal observers and impartial spec-
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in an interesting way. Whereas the behavior of ideal observers is unimpeachable
from the viewpoint of impartial procedures and results, the same cannot be said of
the behavior of impartial spectators. We nd ideal observer decisions unbiased with
respect to what we assume to be distributively just, whereas impartial spectator
behavior was clearly biased due to identication with the stakeholders.
In spite of conceptually having an unreal capacity of decision (Firth 1952), it
is not dicult to carry ideal observers to the laboratory. Real people completely
detached from stakeholders' interests and fortune who have to take a decision in an
articial setting resemble ideal observers. In a sense, they are dispassionate, disin-
terested, and `omniscient' because they have all the information available about the
situation. Setting things that way, our ideal observers are shown to be a homoge-
neous group of well-informed real persons who are not aected by any concrete bias,
such as risk, economic interests or identication.
Although they have been frequently confused with ideal observers, Smithian
impartial spectators possess their own traits. While it was not our intention to test
Adam Smith's theory of impartial spectatorship, Smith's theory provides the main
intuition to design a third-person impartial mechanism. This mechanism resembles
the impartial decision of real decision makers such as members of a jury, judges,
or policy makers that belong to the same society as those stakeholders aected by
their decision.
How can we then bring the impartial spectator to the lab? Interestingly, it
is more dicult to replicate the Smithian spectator in the lab than the detached
ideal observer. Ideal observer procedures seem to t better into the articial setting
of a lab. The subtleties of Smithian spectator theory, the sympathetic decision
of impartial spectators embedded in the situation they have to judge, might seem
to be impossible to recreate in a laboratory setting (Konow 2008, 7). How could
experimental subjects bring the case home to themselves, as Smith demands of
spectators? How can they put themselves in an imaginary way in the place of
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Unlike ideal observers, we force impartial spectators to suer the same un-
fair initial treatment as the stakeholders. This creates a sympathetic attitude by
spectators towards the stakeholders or leads spectators to identify with them. We
nd spectators to favor stakeholders of their own type. Just as veiled stakeholders'
decisions are biased by attitudes toward risk, impartial spectators' decisions may be
biased by favoritism; a clearly anti-egalitarian behavior.12
The fragmentation of society, even of a society as articial as our lab setting,
could aect the decision of a supposedly impartial spectator that shows sympathy
to a special part of society. That is an unintended consequence of an impartiality
theory. We have experimentally demonstrated that sympathy{as in Smith's theory
itself (Griswold 1999, 20){could be an intrinsically unstable feeling because it can
cause impartial results but also biased ones due to favoritism. We depart from other
theoretical and experimental works that consider the Smithian impartial spectator
the best procedure for obtaining impartial results (Konow 2008; Sen 2002).
Finally, the three impartial methods have proven to be rather independent
from the social preferences of the individuals. When measured independently, coop-
erative traits do not play a signicant role in individual's decisions. The decisions
of impartial spectators, ideal observers and veiled stakeholders do not seem to be
biased by these preferences. In contrast, when judging and designing real-life impar-
tial procedures it is very important to take into account sympathy and risk attitudes
to avoid possible biases.
12This favoritism can be partly explained by the Minimal Group Paradigm; a well studied
phenomenon in social psychology (Tajfel 1970; Tajfel et al. 1971), which predicts intergroup
discrimination based on arbitrary and virtually meaningless allocation into groups. However,
we nd that given the match of spectator and stakeholder type, the extent of favoritism is also
moderated by the type itself.
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